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They stumble. They slur. They get behind the wheel of their car and drive. This 
is apparently the case for the 159 million people who have self-reported episodes of 
alcohol impaired driving each year.' Of those 159 million motorists, about 1.4 
million are arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
or narcotics. 2 In 2004, 16,694 people in the United States died in alcohol-related 
motor vehicle crashes, constituting roughly 39 percent of the 42,636 total traffic 
*' Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I 
would like to thank several of my colleagues at Western New England College School of Law for 
reading earlier drafts and offering advice: Lauren Carasik, Arthur Leavens, Jarnison Colbum and 
Barbara Noah. I also want to thank my research assistants, Ben Bristol and Rocco Chiarenza. 
1. NAT'L CTR FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, IMPAIRED DRIVING (2003), 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/drving.htm [hereinafter NCIPC]. 
2. LAWRENCE A. GREENFmLD, BUREAU OF JusTIcE STATIsTICs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
ALCOHOL AND CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA ON THE PREVALENCE OF ALCOHOL 
INVOLVEMENT IN CRIMvE vi, ix (1998), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bj5/pub/pdf/ac.pdf. Greenfield 
states:
 
Since 1975, the U.S. Department of Transportation, through the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), has maintained the annual Fatal Accident Reporting 
System (FARS) which obtains accident-level data on each motor vehicle crash involving a 
fatality. FARS contracts with State agencies to complete a standardized form on each fatal 
accident which includes information such as the weather and road conditions, vehicle 
type, number of passengers and fatalities, the manner of the crash, whether there was a 
drinking or drug-using driver involved, and the specific measurement of blood alcohol 
concentration or BAC (grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood). 
Id. 
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fatalities.3 While this number has decreased since its all time high in 1982,4 statistics 
show that in the mid-1990s the number ofalcohol-related deaths began to rise again.5 
Since then, the percentage of alcohol related crashes has varied only slightly.6 It is 
clear that operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol ("OU") 
remains a widespread crime; a crime that cuts across social, economic, and ethnic 
lines.7 As a result of what some have termed an "epidemic,"8 society is faced with 
the dilemma of how to curtail motorists from driving after consuming too much 
alcohol. 
In response to an all-time high of OUI related deaths in the early 1980s, the 
public started clamoring for legislative response. Consequently, federal and state 
governments enacted stringent OUI laws.9 However, despite the initial public outcry 
3. NCIPC, supra note 1; MADD Online, Statistics http://madd.org/stats/1112 (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2006). This number only takes into account the number of deaths where alcohol impaired 
driving was a factor. It fails to reflect those instances where alcohol is a factor in an accident causing 
injury, serious or not, or in minor motor vehicle accidents without injury. A more accurate picture is 
depicted by the statistic that an alcohol related motor vehicle crash occurs every 31 minutes. NCIPC, 
supranote 1. 
4. In 1982, 26,173 people died in alcohol related accidents. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., ALCOHOL INVOLVEMENT IN FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIc CRASHES, 2003 1 
(2005), http://www.nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/ncsa/rpts/2005/809822.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA]. 
5. According to the NHTSA, in 1982 sixty percent of fatal traffic accidents involved 
alcohol. Id This percentage of alcohol related fatalities declined through the mid 1980s, slightly 
rose in the late 1980s, remained constant for a short time, then slightly declined through the early and 
mid 1990s until the late 1990s when it rose again. Id.2003 marked the first decline in alcohol 
related fatalities since 1999. Id. 
6. MADD Online, MADD Encouraged by Slight Decrease in Alcohol-Related Traffic 
Fatalities, http://www.madd.org/news/9680 (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). Mothers Against Drunk 
Drivers (MADD), a nonprofit organization committed to lobbying state and federal govenments for 
stricter drunk driving laws and to promoting public awareness campaigns, reports that they are 
"cautiously optimistic" about NHTSA's FARS data which estimated a 2.1 percent decrease in 
alcohol-related traffic fatalities from 2003-2004. Id 
7. Alcohol is society's oldest and most popular legal drug. NARCOTICS EDUCATIONAL 
FOUNDATION OF AMERICA, ALCOHOL-A POTENT DRUG 1 (2002), http://cnoa.org/N-02.pdf. 
Throughout American history, the use ofalcohol has transcended gender, race, and social status. As a 
result of our love/hate relationship with alcohol, there has been legislative movement The 
Eighteenth Amendment, passed in 1919, resulted in the total prohibition of alcohol. In 1933, the 
Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment The early 1970s saw the beginning 
of widespread programs conceming alcohol enforcement which, in the 1980s, culminated in a 
significant increase in attention to impaired driving enforcement. See DONALD H. NICHoLs & FLEM 
K.WHrrEDII, DRINKiNG/DRVING LTGATION: CRNwALANDCrvML§ 1:2 (2d ed. 1998). 
8. See, e.g., MADD Online, MADD and Past President Millie I. Webb Awarded Fries Prize 
for Improving Health, http://madd.org/news/6209 (last visited Sept. 20, 2006). 
9. Almost every state in the United States passed stricter OUI laws, including mandatory 
sentencing. Mothers Against Drank Driving reports that since 1981, over 1,250 laws have been 
adopted regarding OUI offenses. See Kelly Mahon Tullier, Governmental Liabilityfor Negligent 
Failureto DetainDrunk Drivers, 7 CORNELL L. REv. 873, 873 n.7 (citing MADD's History, Oct. 
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and response, statistics demonstrate that as many people are currently committing this 
offense as have in the past few decades, and that many of those committing OUI are 
repeat offenders.10 Typically, the majority of Americans are not concerned with the 
problems associated with alcohol impaired driving until a high profile tragedy occurs. 
Unless a life is lost or someone is severely injured the public seems willing to turn the 
other cheek regarding people who drink and drive. Although everyone agrees 
publicly that it is wrong to drink and drive, most people do not consider OU! a 
serious crime. 1 Because of this attitude, a change in the tactics used to combat this 
crime is necessary. 
This article explores different ways to effectively discourage the crime of alcohol 
impaired driving.12 Part I analyzes the trend of utilizing preventive educational 
measures to counteract societal acceptance of this crime and the shortcomings of 
relying exclusively on this measure. Part II discusses OUI prevention based on 
deterrence and the use of stricter penalties, such as mandatory jail sentences, to stop 
alcohol impaired drivers. This section explores whether the trend of increasing the 
severity of the punishment for OUI offenses is effective in stopping the crime. This 
section also discusses the shortcomings of OUI legislation that make deterrence of 
OUI difficult. Part III explores ways to combat the problem of OUI, including 
implementing uniform Dram Shop Laws, providing law enforcement with adequate 
funding to facilitate the apprehension of OUI violators, de-criminalizing first offense 
OUI, and combining preventive societal measures with legal means aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of arrest and the certainty of conviction. Ultimately, to 
properly address this issue, the target of awareness campaigns must shift away from 
the general public and focus on alcohol serving institutions. 
1990, at 1). 
10. See NCIPC, supra note 1. See also ALAN CAVAIOLA & CHARLES WUTH, ASSESSMENT 
AND TREATMENT OF THE DWI OFFENDER 20 (2002) http:/0­
www.haworthpress.com.innopac.lib.bcit.ca/store/sampletext/2194.pdf. (Almost one-third of all 
offenders arrested for OUI are repeat offenders.). 
11. "Of the general driving age public, 97 percent see drinking and driving as a threat to 
their personal safety, and 66 percent feel it is extremely important to do something to reduce the 
problem in terms ofwhere tax dollars should be spent Yet, the occurrence of OUI continues each 
year." MADD Tennessee, Activism, Victim Services, Education, 
http://www.madd.org/stats/1,1056,1789,00.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). 
12. Many refer to this conduct as "drunk driving" but this is a misnomer. The term "drunk" 
typically elicits images of an individual tripping over one's feet, falling down, with extremely slurred 
speech, on the verge of getting sick and passing out. Under most OUI laws, an individual does not 
have to be "drunk" to be convicted. One must only have consumed enough alcohol to impair their 
ability to operate a motor vehicle safely. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (2005). While this 
clearly includes people who are "drunk," it also includes anyone whose motor skills, reflexes, 
balance and coordination are negatively affected by the consumption of alcohol. For that reason, I 
decline to use the term drunk driving and instead refer to it as impaired driving, as this is the conduct 
that legislation regulates 
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I. PREVENTION THROUGH MANIPULATION OF SOCIETAL ATTITUDES 
One way to stop impaired driving is to reduce community tolerance of this crime 
on a widespread basis. In order to achieve this goal, many advocate taking 
preventative educational measures' 3 that focus on a variety of specific behaviors and 
target different groups. First, educational efforts encourage a more responsible 
attitude toward alcohol use by highlighting behavior modification. 14 The most 
relevant modifications include: limiting any alcohol use, limiting the volume of 
alcohol consumed, selecting alternate forms of transportation after consuming 
alcohol, choosing a designated driver, and encouraging peers to intervene actively to 
prevent others from operating under the influence.' 5 Second, educational efforts 
generally target groups such as those who are under the drinking age16 in both school 
and college settings, drinking-age adults, parents, and alcoholics. These groups are 
targeted through the use of media 17 including television, radio spots, and print ads,
18 
as well as through the use of lectures and forums in schools, college campuses, 
churches, and other civic organizations-including Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. 
In reaching out to these groups, advocates are trying to foster a set of values that 
OUI is wrong not only on a personal level but also on a societal level. The stumbling 
block here is that many people think that drinking and driving is an entirely personal 
decision; that each individual has the right to decide whether to accept the risk of 
13. Organizations such as MADD and Students Against Drunk Drivers (SADD) have long 
been working publicly to prevent the occurrence of this crime. Other groups include The National 
Beer Wholesalers Association, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, the National Highway and 
Traffic Safety Administration and the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving. 
14. See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DWI DETECrION AND STANDARDIZED 
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTING: PAR1ICIPANT MANUAL 1-6 (2002) [hereinafter NHTSAMANUAL]. 
15. Another behavioral modification includes not riding with drivers who are impaired. 
However, this only creates a "passive" situation where impaired driving is not stopped and only the 
safety of a potential passenger is protected. 
16. Drinking age laws varied from state to state after the repeal of Prohibition in 1932. In 
1984, Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. §158 (2006). The 
purpose of the Act was to push each state toward enacting a minimum legal age of 21 to purchase 
alcohol. 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Each state was required to have the 21 age requirement prior to 
1986, as a condition of receiving federal highway construction fumds. Id. As a result of this act, all 
fifty states now have a drinking age of 21. Each state prohibits both the purchase and public 
possession of alcoholic beverages for those less than 21 years old. See, e.g., 1986 Haw. Sess. Laws 
804 (temporarily raising the minimum drinking age to 21 years), amended by 1992 Haw. Sess. Laws 
549 (making permanent the minimum drinking age to 21 years). 
17. The information disseminated in this manner is well-known to the general public. Just 
look to the popular and memorable campaigns of "Friends don't let friends drive drunk" and "You 
Drink, You Drive, You Lose." 
18. See MADD Online, Public Service Announcements (PSAS), 
http://www.madd.org/news/0, 156,7898,00.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2006) (examples of television, 
radio and print ads). 
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driving after drinking.19 In order to dispel this dangerous and dated notion, the focus 
must be directed to two areas: that no one has the right to endanger the life and well­
being of others by drinking and driving, and that no one has the right to impose the 
economic burden on others as a result of injuries, caused while OUI.2 ° Of these 
automobile accidents, approximately thirty percent are alcohol-related, adding up to 
2$45 billion in related costs each year. 1 The CDC estimates that the cost of alcohol-
related crashes in the United States is about $51 billion each year.22 
With continued educational programs, it is fair to expect that today's children 
will have a different attitude toward drinking and driving than their parents. 23 To see 
how preventative programs can be successful one need only look at the campaign 
designed to stop people from smoking. Previous generations smoked cigarettes 
without regard to the health implications. After years of educational and preventative 
programs, the prevalence of cigarette smoking among U.S. adults decreased from 
42.4 percent in 1965 to 21.6 percent in 2003.24 The proliferation of "Thank You for 
Not Smoking" signs and the enforcement of smoke-free work-place policies as well 
as smoke-free bars and restaurants are testaments to society's change in attitude 
regarding the behavior of smoking.25 
Another useful example of how a preventative campaign can change public 
behavior is the campaign to encourage the use of seat belts while driving in 
automobiles. Automobiles have contained seat belts since the 1950s; however, until 
the early 1980s, only 14 percent of adults used a seat belt.26 As states began to pass 
19. NHTSA MANUAL, supranote 14, at 11-6. 
20. Id. 
21. MARGARET C. JASPER, DRUNK DRIVING LAW 3-4 (1999). The costs associated with 
automobile accidents each year are vast: $150 billion, including $19 billion in medical care and 
emergency expenses; $42 billion in lost productivity; $52 billion in property damage; and $37 billion 
in miscellaneous crash-related costs. Id 
22. See NCIPC, supranote 1. 
23. See NHTSA MANUAL, supranote 14, at 11-7. 
24. Compare Center for Disease Control, Cigarette Smoking Among Young Adults-
United States, 1992, and Changes in the Definition of Current Cigarette Smoking, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmlO0033250.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2006); with 
Center for Disease Control, Cigarette Smoking Among Adults-United States, 2003, 
http://www.cdc.gov.mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6520a3,htm (last visited Aug. 26,2006). 
25. The correlation between smoking and health issues played a large role in deterring 
individuals from smoking. Educating the public to these serious health risks and the likelihood of 
becoming ill was paramount in curtailing the use ofcigarettes. In the same fashion, it is not only vital 
to educate the public about the risks of OUI, it is necessary to focus on the likelihood of getting 
caught and punished. 
26. THoMAS MICHAEL KOWALICK, PROACTIVE USE OF HIGHWAY RECORDED DATA VIA AN 
EVENT DATA RECORDER (EDR) To AcHIvE NATIONWiDE SEAT BELT USAGE IN THE 9e T PERCENTILE 
By 2002 (1999), http://www.ntsb.gov/events/symprec/proceedings/authors/kowalick.htm (providing 
a brief history of seat belt usage in the United States). 
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seat belt laws, the usage rate increased.27 Through the use of legislation, law 
enforcement, and publicity (intended to be both educational and intimidating), the 
compliance rate increased to as high as 82 percent usage by June 2005.
28 Many 
believe that public awareness initiatives such as President Clinton's Buckle Up 
America Campaign, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
('NHTSA"), and the Air Bag & Safety Belt Campaign of "Click It or Ticket" are at 
least partially responsible for increasing seat belt use. 
29 
Finally, the HIV/AIDS prevention programs are examples of successful 
awareness campaigns. Programs such as peer outreach for gay men, street outreach 
for injection-drug users, education programs for youth in and out of school, and faith-
based initiatives in African-American communities have all been credited with the 
successful reduction of the disease.30 Since HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns began, 
the rate of new infections has dropped significantly. At the height of the epidemic in31 
the late 1980s, the rate of new infections in the U.S. was over 150,000 per year.
This number decreased significantly to 40,000 new infections in 2001. 
32 However, 
the success of the HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns, like many public health 
initiatives, has taken time, and the campaign has yet to reduce transmission of the 
virus to an acceptable level.33 
27. In 1987, 31 states passed mandatory seat belt laws, and the rate of usage increased to 42 
percent. As more states passed these laws, the rate continued to increase. In 1998, the national seat 
belt use rate was 68 percent. By 1999, forty-nine states and the District ofColumbia had enacted seat 
belt laws (New Hampshire being the only state with a limited seat belt law). Id. Since that time, the 
rate has increased to 82 percent in 2005. See DONNA GLASSBRENNER, SAFETY BELT USE IN 2004­
OVERALL RESULTS (2004), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd­
30/NCSA/RNotes/2004/809783.pdf, DONNA GLASSBRENNER, SAFETY BELT USE IN 2005­
DEMOGRAPHIC REsULTS (2005), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd­
30/NCSA/RNotes/2005/809969.pdf. 
28. DONNA GLASSBRENNER, SAFETY BELT USE IN 2005--OvERALL RESULTs (2005), 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/RNotes/2005/809-932/images/809932.pdf 
29. See News Release, National Safety Council, Click It or Ticket Mobilization May 25 ­
May 31, 2005 (2004), availableathttp://www.nsc.org/airbag.htm. 
30. Ctr. for Disease Control, HIV Prevention: Now More than Ever, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/brochure/prevention.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) (timeline 




33. The AIDS/HIV prevention campaigns began in 1983, just a few years after the epidemic 
began. The National Institute of Health (NIH) provides a timeline that cites the commencement ofa 
published informal newsletter in August 1983 as a first step towards public awareness. This 
newsletter continued until articles discussing AIDS began to be published in mainstreamjournals. In 
Their Own Words: NIH Researchers Recall the Early Years of AIDS, Timeline, 1981-1988, 
http://aidshistory.nih.gov/timeline/index.htal (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). Additionally, the CDC 
provides a timeline which points to March 4, 1983 as the date when the CDC, FDA and NIH 
provided initial prevention recommendations regarding how to prevent sexual, drug-related, and 
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Unfortunately, the success of the HIV/AIDS awareness campaign, and other 
similar preventative education initiatives like it, can come with a downside known as 
"message burnout." 34  This happens when the flood of prevention messages 
desensitizes the targeted group. This can be seen when you look at the impact of 
perceived consequences of contracting HIV/AIDS on infection rates. After 20 years 
of successful public awareness and health education regarding HIV/AIDS, some 
argue that the general public and those who are HIV-positive are knowledgeable but 
35 also tired of hearing about the importance of practicing safer sex. Among older 
gay/bisexual men who have matured during the height of the epidemic in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, prevention message burnout may facilitate the abandonment of safer 
sexual practices. 36 Moreover, among younger gay/bisexual men, who were not 
present during these early years and who have not seen their friends die in large 
numbers since the rate of infection decreased, taking the advice to practice safer sex 
may not seem a high priority.
37 
In addition to the possibility of "message burnout," another concern of relying 
solely on preventive educational measures to combat OUI is that this strategy will 
take a substantial amount of time. Ultimately, until a significant majority of society 
views OUTI as a negative behavior that cannot be tolerated or condoned, the public's 
behavior will not sufficiently change. Unfortunately, such a significant change in 
societal attitudes about impaired driving will take years, if not generations to be 
effective. Working against future generation's attitudinal changes regarding alcohol 
use is the notion that consuming alcohol is now and has always been an integral part 
of our society.38 As adults continue to drink alcohol in the presence of children, even 
when done modestly and responsibly, a confusing message is sent that desensitizes 
our youth to the issues that arise out of alcohol consumption. Because of this, 
preventative education campaigns cannot be the centerpiece ofa program designed to 
combat OUI, but instead, should be used as a supplement to more traditional methods 
of deterrence. 
occupational transmission. The CDC's timeline also shows the preventative programs to have taken 
a dramatic effect by 1990, when the new infection rate began to stabilize at 40,000. See Ctr. for 
Disease Control, Milestones in the US HIV Epidemic, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/mmwr/timeline%20rev2.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2006). 
34. MAYOR'S AIDS LEADERSIw CouNciL, HIV AND AIDS INLos ANGELES: 21sCENTURY 
CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES 27 (2003), http//www.lacity.org/dod/aids/documents/2003. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id.See also discussion infra Part II (regarding the diminishment of the perceived 
consequences as a result ofnew anti-retroviral medications). 
38. See NICHOLs & WHITED, supranote 7, at § 1:2. 
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1I. PREVENTION THROUGH THE USE OF TRADITIONAL DETERRENCE 
Rather than focus on prevention based on education, deterrence is the process of 
discouraging certain behavior by creating fear of arrest and punishment.39 Deterrence 
is broken into two categories: specific and general. "Specific deterrence" is directed 
toward the individual and focuses on inflicting punishment to discourage that person 
from engaging in the same criminal behavior again.40 It is meant to persuade a 
specific violator that there is indeed something to fear as a result of being caught, and 
to emphasize that if there is a next time, the punishment will be even more severe. 
"General deterrence" is directed toward the public at large41 and is intended to serve 
as a message to members of society that committing a certain act will not be tolerated 
and that such behavior has consequences. 
In order for deterrence strategies to be effective, an individual must know and 
understand the potential consequences of his or her action. Under this theory, it is 
argued that when an individual knows and understands the risks associated with a 
particular undesirable act, they will then perform an analysis and weigh the risks of 
getting caught and punished against their perceived benefit from the wrongdoing.42 
When an individual realizes that the risk outweighs the benefit, they will be 
persuaded or deterred from engaging in the criminal conduct. 
43 
Traditional criminal law deterrence theory asserts that an individual's perception 
of the punishment meted out for engaging in a particular behavior has a substantial 
impact on deterring that individual's conduct.44 Those advocating under this theory 
argue that deterrence can be achieved through the enactment of stricter penalties, and 
the legislature has responded to these demands.45 In the framework of OUI, the first 
39. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS (1764). See also BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY481 (8th ed. 2004). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CONTROL 1 (1973). 
43. This utilitarian view is at the root of the justification for the use of criminal punishment. 
See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 38 (J.H. 
Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1982) (1789); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 8 (Longmans, Green, 
& Co. 1907) (1863); ZIMRNG &HAKIN, supranote42, at 1. 
44. Tracey Meares, et al., Updating the Study ofPunishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171-73 
(2004) ("The traditional analysis simply turns on whether the penalty is set at an appropriate level to 
optimize deterrence--balancing the cost of the activity against the cost of enforcement") (citing 
NICHOLAS N. KITrRIE & ELYCE H. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS: LAW, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 15 (1981) ("[S]ociety hopes to deter wrongdoing by posing specific 
punishments ... with the expectation that the punishment will have a double effect: both convincing 
the lawbreaker not to repeat his transgression and, at the same time, serving as a 'cautionary tale,' a 
waning deterrent to other members of society."). 
45. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supranote 42, at 18-19. 
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laws criminalizing this action were enacted soon after the invention of the motor 
vehicle.46  Since that time, states have increased the severity of sanctions, most 
coming about in the 1980s as a result of the Presidential Commission on Drunk 
Driving and citizen organizations such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
("MADD"). Responding to pressure about the increase in occurrence of OUI, 47 
states have adopted some form of mandatory minimum sentences for OUI drivers, 
typically for subsequent offenders.47 A first time OUI offender generally receives 
probation, a fine, some form of alcohol counseling and some form of driver's 
education schooling.48 In addition to these punishments, virtually every state either 
suspends or revokes an individual's right to operate a motor vehicle upon conviction 
for a first OUI offense.4 9 Other penalties include confiscation ofthe vehicle's license 
plates,50 requiring ignition interlock devices, 51 and vehicle forfeiture.52  Yet, even 
with these varying punishments, the crime of OUI continues to occur in large 
numbers.53 
46. See JAMES JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 57 (1989). See also 
Jeffrey Robert Connolly, Maas v. Department of Commerce and Regulation: Why Can't South 
Dakota Curb Repeat Offenses ofDrivingUnder theInfluence?, 50 S.D. L. REV. 352, 357 n.48 (2005) 
("Drinking and driving has been regulated in South Dakota nearly as long as driving itself South 
Dakota's first drunk driving law, passed in 1913, simply prohibited driving while "under the influence 
of liquor.") (citing 1913 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 277 § 1 ("This law was approved on March 3, 1913, and 
stated, 'It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or attempt to operate any automobile or other 
motor vehicle in this state while such person is under the influence of liquor.')). 
47. The three states that do not impose mandatory minimum sentences for OUI convictions 
are Mississippi, New York, and South Dakota. See JASPER, supranote 21, at 140-41. 
48. GALE GROUP, NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 129 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 4th ed. 
2003). 
49. See id.(surveying the way each state sanctions OUI); see generallyJASPER, supranote 
21. 
50. Fourteen states confiscate license plates: Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia and 
Wyoming. See JASPER, supranote 21, at 123-25. 
51. An ignition interlock is a device that has a breath tester that drivers blow into to measure 
their blood alcohol level, and which, if alcohol is detected, prevents the vehicle from starting. Id. at 
151. Thirty seven states have such laws: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 127-29. 
52. Twenty-two states have vehicle confiscation laws: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermiont 
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at 131-33. 
53. See supranotes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1 
There is widespread debate regarding the validity of the belief that criminal 
punishment actually deters one's behavior.54  While most agree that the general 
existence of a criminal justice system that punishes individuals for committing crime 
does help to deter criminal conduct,55 some argue the only benefit of this system is in 
the form of a general warning to potential criminals, and that potential punishment 
has little to no bearing on the outcome of any individual's decision to violate the 
law.56 Relying on a social science analysis, many commentators have concluded that 
criminal law does not deter because numerous likely offenders are not aware of the 
law or its consequences if broken.57 Furthermore, even if they are aware of the 
consequences, they will likely weigh the benefit58 of their committing the offense 
against the cost of getting caught and commit the crime anyway.59 Others, relying on 
social influence factors, argue that criminal law does not deter when individuals 
"perceive that criminal activity is widespread." 60 This argument recognizes that 
when a certain criminal activity is widespread, individuals "are likely to infer that the 
risk of being caught for a crime is low" and "might also conclude that relatively little 
stigma or reputational cost attaches to being a criminal. . . ."1 This appears 
especially true in terms of the crime of OUI. The general public seems unwilling to 
54. Scholarship on the deterrence theory and its validity is plentiful. In this article I do not 
attempt to repeat the analysis engaged in by the plethora of criminal scholars. Instead, I analyze the 
deterrence theory as it applies specifically to OUI law. For a discussion of the effectiveness of 
assigning punishment to criminal behavior as an effort to deter crime, see generallyDaniel S. Nagin, 
Criminal Deterrence Research At The Outset OfThe Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1 
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, andDeterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 
(1997); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role ofDeterrencein the Formulationof Criminal 
Law Rules: At Its Worst When DoingIts Best, 91 GEo. L. J. 949 (2003); Tracey Meares et al., supra 
note 44, at 1171-72 (questioning the use of traditional deterrence theory and suggesting that a modem 
deterrence analysis must be used that incorporates substitution effects, decision framing, educational 
impact of laws, social control and perceived legitimacy); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The 
DeterrentEffect ofPerceivedCertaintyandSeverity ofPunishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721 
(1989); Anthony N. Doobs & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the 
NullHypothesis,30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003). 
55. See PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND INCAPAcrrATIVE EFFECTs, DETERRENCE 
AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECrS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIMvIE RATES 19 (Alfired 
Blumstein et. al. eds., 1978); Nagin, supranote 54, at 1; Robinson & Darley, supranote 54, at 950. 
56. Robinson &Darley, supranote 54, at 951. 
57. See id.at 953; Meares et al., supranote 44, at 1182. 
58. In terms of committing the crime of 01, the benefit to the offender is a matter of 
personal convenience in terms of mobility. 
59. Robinson & Darley, supranote 54, at 953. 
60. Kahan, supranote 54, at 350 (defining social influence as "how individual's perceptions 
of each others' values, beliefs, and behavior affect their conduct, including their decisions to engage 
incrime."). 
61. Id. 
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stigmatize someone as a criminal for consuming too much alcohol and operating a 
motor vehicle. 
Another argument in opposition to the enactment of stricter penalties for crimes 
committed is that increasing the severity of the punishment may reduce the deterrent 
effect by actually lessening the certainty of the law's application.62 Opponents of 
stricter penalties claim when "states adopt more severe laws, police grow more 
reluctant to arrest, prosecutors to charge, juries to convict, and judges to punish. As a 
result, such reforms do nothing to reduce the incidence of these offenses." 63 In 
addition, the administration of the law gets thwarted as "mandatory minimum 
sentences can be circumvented by plea bargains or selective prosecution."
64 
While the debate regarding the validity of deterrence based criminal justice 
systems continue, our system has yet to replace deterrence theory with any viable 
alternative. Instead, when these stricter penalties do not curb the problem, many 
believe the answer is to strengthen the severity of the penalty.65  This narrow 
approach, that stricter penalties are the answer, places focus on the end result and fails 
to take into consideration the importance of two primary requirements: being caught 
and being convicted. To make deterrence meaningful, the driving public must fear 
being caught and convicted, not just fear the potential punishment.66 
Emphasizing not just stricter sentences, but also improving the public's 
awareness of the increased likelihood of being caught and convicted is a logical next 
step in addressing the problem of OUI. Such a change in emphasis should cause a 
greater deterrent affect because there is a direct correlation between the certainty of 
being caught and individuals deciding against criminal behavior.67 If enough of the 
public believes they will be caught if they drink and drive, at least some of them will 
stop engaging in this behavior. Initially, when the public is made aware of new, 
stricter penalties for a crime, the number of people willing to take the chance and 
engage in the activity fals.68 After stringent legislation is passed, criminal behavior is 
62. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. HardShoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,67 
U. Ctfl. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (2000). 
63. Id. 
64. Nagin, supranote 54, at 6. 
65. See JACOBS, supranote 46, at 106. 
66. H. LAURENCE Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL xvii (Lexington Books 1982). Ross believes that it is not the severity of the punishment 
that deters, but the swiftness and certainty of that punishment that deters. "Changes in the law 
promising increased certainty or combined certainty of punishment reduce the amount of drinking 
and driving." Id. at 102-03. "Innovations confined to manipulation of the severity of the legal 
punishment, without a concomitant change in its certainty, produce no effect on the apparent 
incidence of drinking and driving or its aftermath in crashes." Id. at 103. 
67. Id.at 102-03. 
68. Criminologist H. Laurence Ross conducted a study on the impact of the British Road 
Safety Act and concluded that the maximum deterrent impact on an individual's behavior occurred 
just prior to and right after the enactment of a new law primarily because publicity and public 
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likely to slow and remain that way until the public learns through experience that the 
likelihood of being caught, convicted and punished (regardless of the severity of the 
punishment) is low.69 At that point, criminal behavior will increase again.70 OUI 
laws in the United States have demonstrated this. After the legislature in all 50 states 
enacted new OUI laws in the 1980s, the statistics on OUI show a sharp drop in the 
offense. 71 However, after a period of time, the number of OUI incidents rose to its 
prior level.72 
It is clear that the likelihood of getting caught plays an integral part in an 
individual's decision to risk driving after consuming too much alcohol.73 The 
question remains, how many people who drive after consuming too much alcohol 
must be arrested in order to convince the public that there is a real risk of arrest for 
OU? According to the NHTSA, 
several programs have demonstrated that significant deterrence can be achieved 
by arresting one OUI violator for every 400 OUI violations committed. 
Currently, however, for every OUT violator arrested, there are between 500 and 
2,000 OUI violations committed. When the chances of being arrested are one in 
two thousand, the average OUI violator really has little to fear. 4 
In addition, when an individual is caught but there is little likelihood that their arrest 
will result in a conviction, the violator has even less to fear. 
concern are usually at their highest at this time. See H. Laurence Ross, Law, Science, andAccidents: 
The British Road Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1973); see also Geoffrey Neff, Sticky 
Fingersor Sticky Norms? UnauthorizedMusic Downloadingand UnsettledSocialNorns, 93 GEo. 
L. J. 733, 753-54 (discussing how initial publicity about "new get tough, law enforcement measures 
leads to exaggerated estimates of the risk ofgetting caught and punished, and subsequently to a lull in 
lawbreaking conduct." But, after a few months, experience taught that the risk of being caught was 
much lower than initial estimation and the conduct returned to the same level). 
69. Neff, supranote 68, at 753-54. 
70. Id. 
71. See NHTSA, supranote 4, at 1. 
72. Id 
73. See Ross supra note 66, at 102-03. 
74. NHTSA MANUAL, supranote 14, at II-1. 
In a 1975 study conducted in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, only 22 percent of traffic violators 
who were stopped with BACs between .10 and .20 were arrested for DWI. The 
remainder was cited for other violations, even though they were legally impaired. In this 
study the breath tests were administered to the violators by researchers after the police had 
completed their investigations. The officers failed to detect 78 percent of the DWI 
violators they investigated. The implication of the study, and of other similar studies, is 
that for every DWI violator actually arrested for DWI, three others are contacted by police 
officers, but are not arrested for DWI. It is clear that significant improvement in the arrest 
rate could be achieved ifofficers were more skilled at DWI detection. 
Id.at 11-2. 
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How individuals weigh the consequences of their actions has a significant impact 
on their determination ofwhether or not to engage in a particular behavior, even if the 
outcome could be deadly. The HIV/AJDS epidemic demonstrates that when people 
perceive the consequences of their actions as minor, they are more likely to engage in 
the behavior.75  New medications, such as highly active anti-retroviral therapy, 
provide a false sense of security to some individuals who no longer see contracting 
HIV/AIDS as a death sentence and are now more likely to engage in risky behavior.7
6 
This, coupled with message burnout, has likely caused the number of people 
contracting HIV to increase. 7 7 Likewise, individuals who see the likelihood of being 
caught, convicted and punished for driving under the influence as unlikely, will 
probably continue to engage in this behavior. Additionally, the very nature of OUI 
poses an obstacle regarding perception of consequences because the effect of alcohol 
may make some offenders lack the self restraint and willpower needed to keep from 
getting behind the wheel of a car and driving.78 This lack of willpower coupled with 
the perception that the chance of getting caught is low conceivably increases the 
occurrence of the crime.79 
Making the public aware that they are likely to be caught is no easy task. 
However, the more difficult task may actually be getting a judge orjury to convict an 
individual for committing this crime. In order to convict, you must have a fact finder 
who is willing to do so. One obstacle in obtaining such a conviction is that the public 
tends to think "many of the people in alcohol related offenses typically are moderate 
drinkers like most of themselves." 80 The general public does not appreciate that 
"those involved in crashes after drinking typically have consumed exceptionally large 
amounts of alcohol." 81 Nor do they appreciate that not everyone arrested for OUI is a 
light to moderate drinker. As a result, when deciding an offender's guilt or innocence 
they employ a "but for the grace of God go I" rationale and believe it is unreasonable 
to penalize offenders unduly.82 These beliefs are reinforced by the fact that a majority 
of adult Americans do occasionally drive after some drinking.
83 
In addition to confronting and overcoming the perceptions held by prospective 
jurors, prosecutors must contend with statutes that fail to capitalize on deterrent 
producing sanctions and a judiciary that has, in some states, made rulings that 
75. MAYoR's AIDS LEADERsw-i CouNciL, supranote 34, at 27. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See infranotes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
79. See THE GALLUP ORGANIZATON, NAT'L SURVEY OF DRiNKING & DRIVING ATTrrUDES & 
BEHAvioRS: 1999 53 (2000). 
80. Ross, supranote 66, at xiii. 
81. Id.at xiv. 
82. Id at xiii-xiv. 
83. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A FeministFourthAmendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy,and 
SocialMeaningIn Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J.GENDER L. POL'Y 1,67 (2002). 
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prohibit the introduction of evidence useful for obtaining a conviction.84 Watered 
down versions of anti-OUI legislation and the rulings of some courts regarding the 
inadmissibility of breath and field sobriety test refusal evidence, make the certainty of 
a conviction less probable. 
Massachusetts is one such jurisdiction where OUI laws have been historically 
lax and where the certainty of conviction and punishment is suspect. Only recently 
has the Massachusetts legislature passed Melanie's Law, a bill aimed at fighting 
alcohol impaired driving.85 In its original design, the bill was meant to "crack down" 
on all OUI offenders, in particular those who refused to take the breath test, repeat 
offenders, and those who are under the age of 21 .86 One of the proposed changes to 
Massachusetts OUI law was an increase to the administrative consequence of an 
operator's loss of license for refusing to submit to a breath test from 180 days to one 
year for a first offense and a lifetime suspension for refusing a breath test on a second 
or subsequent offense.87  Another proposed change to the OUI law was an 
84. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1077-78 (Mass. 1992) 
(holding a statute making admissible evidence ofa refusal to take a breath test unconstitutional). See 
also Commonwealth v. Blais, 701 N.E.2d 314, 317-18 (Mass. 1998); Commonwealth v. McGrail, 
647 N.E.2d 712, 714-15 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v. Grenier, 695 N.E.2d 1075, 1076-78 (Mass. 
App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Davidson, 545 N.E.2d 55, 56-57 (Mass. App. 1989) (Although a 
driver is under legal obligation to submit to field sobriety tests, a refusal to do so may not be used as 
evidence against the driver at trial). 
85. 2005 Mass. Acts ch. 122. Melanie's Law was named after a 13 year old girl who was 
killed after being hit by a repeat OUI offender. H.B. 4099, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2005). 
86. H.B. 4099, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2005). 
87. H.J. 691, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2005); but cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 24{l)(f)(1) 
(2005). Currently providing: 
the police officer shall: (i) immediately, on behalf of the registrar, take custody of such 
person's license or right to operate issued by the Commonwealth; (ii) provide to each 
person who refuses such test, on behalfof the registrar, a written notification ofsuspension 
in a format approved by the registrar, and (iii) impound the vehicle being driven by the 
operator and arrange for the vehicle to be impounded for a period of 12 hours after the 
operator's refusal, with the costs for the towing, storage and maintenance ofthe vehicle to 
be bome by the operator. The police officer before whom such refusal was made shall, 
within 24 hours, prepare a report of such refusal. Each report shall be made in a format 
approved by the registrar and shall be made under the penalties of perjury by the police 
officer before whom such refusal was made. Each report shall set forth the grounds for the 
officer's belief that the person arrested had been operating a motor vehicle on a way or 
place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and shall state that such person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or analysis when requested by the officer to do so, 
such refusal having been witnessed by another person other than the defendant. Each 
report shall identify the police officer who requested the chemical test or analysis and the 
other person witnessing the refusal. Each report shall be sent forthwith to the registrar 
along with a copy of the notice of intent to suspend in a form, including electronic or 
otherwise, that the registrar deems appropriate. A license or right to operate which has 
been confiscated pursuant to this subparagraph shall be forwarded to the registrar 
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administrative license suspension of one year for refusing to take roadside field 
sobriety tests.88 A third proposed change was an increase in the penalty for driving 
with a license suspended for an OUI conviction from a 60 day to a 90 day mandatory 
jail sentence. 89  Unfortunately, the final version of the law was watered down, 
particularly in the area ofbreath test and field sobriety test refusals.
90 
Instead of increasing the administrative loss of license for refusing to take a 
breath test from 180 days to one year for a first offense, Melanie's law left intact the 
180 day penalty.91 The legislation completely ignored the issue of creating a penalty 
for refusing to submit to a field sobriety test. In addition, the legislature missed the 
chance to reconsider an important issue concerning what happens when an 
individual's license is administratively suspended for failure to take the breath test 
and during that suspension period the individual is brought to trial for OUI and is 
found not guilty. Under the current system, as soon as the individual is found not 
forthwith. The report shall constitute prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein at 
any administrative hearing regarding the suspension specified in this section. 
88. H. J. 689, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2005). 
89. S.B. 2218, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2005). A weakened version of these proposals included 
increasing the administrative loss of license consequence for refusing to submit to a breath test from 
six months to one year only for those who have a prior conviction for OUI or who have refused to 
take the test once before and for those who are under the age of twenty-one. Thus, increasing the 
penalty from six months to five years for those with two prior convictions or breath test refusals, and 
increasing the penalty from six months to a lifetime suspension for those with three or more 
convictions or breath test refusals. Id. 
90. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 24(l)(f)(1) (2005). The bill did include some stricter 
provisions regarding driving while under the influence of alcohol with a child under 14 in the car, 
knowingly loaning a car to someone who is drunk, and manslaughter by drunk driving. See 
generally, 2005 Mass. Acts ch. 122. It also requires that individuals with more than one impaired 
driving conviction install an ignition interlock device on their vehicle as a condition of having their 
license reinstated. Id. This device prevents the vehicle from operating if the blood alcohol content is 
above .02. In addition, an offender's vehicle may also be forfeited for persons with three previous 
convictions if they own the vehicle they are driving. Id. Finally, it provided that the prosecution can 
prove a subsequent offense by using court and probation documents that are self-authenticating, 
thereby obviating the need for live testimony from witnesses such as the prior arresting officer, 
records clerks, and probation officers. Id. 
91. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §24(l)(1(l) (2005). Some legislators stated that the proposed 
penalty for refusing the breath test was too harsh and would punish people who were ultimately 
acquitted of OUI. Scott S. Greenberger, Lawmakers Toughen DrunkenDrivingBill, BOsTON GLOBE, 
Oct. 28, 2005, 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2005/10/28/lawmakerstoughen_drunken 
_driving bill. This argument fails to take into consideration that the suspension is for refusing the 
breath test, not a punishment for operating under the influence of alcohol. The sanctions imposed 
under Melanie's Law for refusing to take a breath test are: 180 day loss of license for a first offense, 3 
year loss of license for a second offense, 5 year loss of license for a third offense, and lifetime loss of 
license for a fourth offense. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 §24 (l)(0(l) (2005). 
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guilty, that person is entitled to an immediate reinstatement of his license.9 2 The bill 
did not capitalize on this opportunity to deny that reinstatement and failed to 
recognize that the suspension is not punishment for the alleged OUI, but instead is an 
administrative consequence for failing to take the breath test. 
Suspending an individual's license for refusing to take the breath test is entirely 
appropriate, as operating a motor vehicle is a privilege that is regulated by the state.
93 
Massachusetts is an implied consent state where, under Massachusetts General Laws, 
all operators of motor vehicles are deemed to have consented to a breath test if 
suspected of OUI simply by virtue of driving a car.9 4  This statute provides 
"[w]hoever operates a motor vehicle upon any way .. .shall be deemed to have 
consented to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath or blood in the event 
that he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor ....9F The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that a 
mandatory administrative license suspension for OUI was "a reasonable sanction 
primarily designed to promote public safety. 9 6 The Court went on to hold "that 
Massachusetts may suspend a license pursuant to c. 90, § 24(1)(f)(1), and later bring 
criminal charges under c. 90, § 24(l)(a)(1), without running afoul of the double 
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution or Massachusetts common or 
statutory law."97 It is clear that there is no right to refuse to take a breath test. If you 
refuse, your license is suspended.9s  Unfortunately, the current administrative 
suspension does not act as a deterrent because there is no certainty of its continued 
application. If an individual goes to trial and is found not guilty, the system tells the 
offender that it was acceptable to refuse to take the test. This defeats the purpose of 
the statute and thwarts any attempt at deterrence. While Melanie's Law marks the 
toughest stance Massachusetts has ever taken on alcohol impaired driving, and the 
92. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 90 § 24 (1)(f)(1) (2005). This section provides: 
[T]he defendant may immediately, upon the entry of a not guilty finding or dismissal of all 
charges under this section, section 24Q, section 24L, or section 13 1/2 of chapter 265, and 
in the absence of any other alcohol related charges pending against said defendant, apply 
for and be immediately granted a hearing before the court which took final action on the 
charges for the purpose of requesting the restoration of said license. At said hearing, there 
shall be a rebuttable presumption that said license be restored, unless the commonwealth 
shall establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that restoration of said license 
would likely endanger the public safety. 
93. See Roberto v. Dep't of Pub. Util., 160 N.E. 321, 322 (Mass. 1928) (having a driver's 
license is "a privilege" that is "neither a contract nor property, and its revocation deprived the 
petitioner of no vested right"); Luk v. Commonwealth, 658 N.E. 2d 664, 669-70 (Mass. 1995) 
("one's right to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege voluntarily granted."). 
94. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 24(1)(f)(1) (2005). 
95. Id. 
96. Luk, 658 N.E. 2d at 673. 
97. Id. 
98. Id.at 670-71. 
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passing of this law is a step in the right direction, it is by no means a guaranty that 
alcohol impaired driving will diminish in Massachusetts.99 Without the certainty of 
consequences for acts such as refusing a breath test and field sobriety tests, the impact 
is reduced. 
The same can be said with respect to the impact of state court decisions on the 
certainty of conviction. In Massachusetts, when an individual refuses to take a breath 
test or to perform standardized field sobriety tests, the prosecution is not allowed to 
inform the finder of fact that the defendant refused.100 While this may not seem 
significant to some, it is bound to have an impact on ajury's decision of innocence or 
guilt.10 1 OUI is a well known crime. It is fair to say that the public knows that breath 
test machines are used after an individual is arrested for OUI to determine how much 
0 2alcohol the individual consumed.1 It is also fair to say that they expect to hear the 
results of such a test or an explanation as to the absence of test results during an OUI 
trial. What the public does not know is that the prosecution is barred from 
introducing the defendant's refusal to take the breath test, which may leave jurors to 
0 3speculate over the absence of this evidence. 1 Some jurors may believe that the 
absence of breath test evidence signifies that the police officer did not afford the 
defendant the opportunity to take the test or that the police officer did not think the 
defendant was overly intoxicated and did not bother to offer the test.1°4 A remedy to 
a court's decision precluding the prosecution from introducing this evidence may be 
to mandate that the judge give a limiting instruction admonishing the jury that they 
are not to think about or otherwise consider the fact that no evidence was offered 
concerning a breath test.'0 5 This may help improve the certainty of conviction and 
thus help produce a greater deterrent effect on motorists. 
99. Some have speculated that the failure of the law to address the concerns raised in this 
section stem from the fact that many of the members of the House of Representatives are attorneys 
who have a significant practice defending individuals charged with OUt. Greenberger, supra note 
91; Justin Graeber, Melanies Bill Becomes Melanies Law, HANSON EXPRESs, November 2, 2005, 
http://www.hansonexpress.com/article_163.shtml. 
100. See cases cited supranote 84. 
101. See Commonwealth v. Downs, 758 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 n.l (Mass. 2001) (stating that 
"jurors had made it clear to him in other cases through questions during their deliberations or after 
their verdicts that they had engaged inspeculation about the absence ofbreathalyzer evidence."). 
102. Id.at 1065 (explaining that the court could not "close [their] eyes to the fact that there is 
wide-spread public information and common knowledge about breathalyzer testing."). 
103. Id.at 1064. 
104. Id. at 1065 (stating "[t]o instruct the jury without any reference whatsoever to 
breathalyzer testing could well lead to distinct prejudice to a defendant."). 'The absence of some 
form of an instruction could also cause conjecture or speculation resulting in unfairness to the 
Commonwealth, e.g., the police didn't offer the breathalyzer to a defendant or perhaps the 
breathalyzer was not in working order." Id.at 1065 n.2. 
105. In Downs, the court discussed the use of limiting instructions in OUI breath test refusal 
cases and held that such an instruction would be appropriate. Id.at 1063-65. 
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III. STRATEGY TO COMBAT OUI 
With all these considerations in mind, it is time to employ a comprehensive 
strategy to stop the continuing problem of OUI. While the current public awareness 
campaigns are important and useful, they have not been successful at stopping 
OU. 16It is time to shift the focus regarding who these campaigns are targeting. 
First, the campaigns need to target the establishments that serve alcohol to 
prospective drivers.107 These places must be made to understand and appreciate that 
impaired driving is a problem that can be curtailed with more responsible actions on 
their behalf Alcohol vendors must recognize that the action of serving an individual 
up to and past the point of intoxication creates a significant risk to the public and 
potentially grave consequences in terms of their liability. To drive this message 
home, all states must impose Dram Shop Laws.' °8 Next, states must ensure that their 
law enforcement officers are properly equipped to enforce the OUI laws. For that to 
happen, there has to be adequate funding allocated to law enforcement to enhance 
their front line defense against offenders, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
offenders getting caught. Finally, states must enact policies that increase the certainty 
of conviction and punishment of offenders after being apprehended for OLT109 At 
least one commentator argues that decriminalizing a first offense OUI where there is 
no injury will serve that end.' 0 However, this strategy fails to take into consideration 
the impact this message sends to the public and is not a viable option. Other, more 
effective policies include legislation that allows prosecutors to prove subsequent 
offenses through the use of court documents, enhancing the penalty for driving while 
one's license is suspended for OUI, as well as handing down penalties that are 
creative and actually discourage an individual from operating under the influence of 
alcohol.' ' 
106. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supranote 79, at 10. See also GREENFIELD supranote 2, 
at ix. 
107. I include in this category any licensed outlet such as a bar, tavern, or restaurant as well as 
any organization that serves alcohol. 
108. Dram shop liability laws hold those who serve alcohol to patrons responsible for any 
harm that intoxicated or underage patrons cause to other people (or, in some cases, to themselves). 
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PREVENTING OVER-CONSUMPTION OFALCOHOL- SALES TO 
THE INTOXICATED AND "HAPPY HOUR" (DRINK SPECIAL) LAWS 4-5 (2005), 
www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/PIREWeb/images/2240PIERFINAL.pdf [hereinafter 
NHTSA HAPPY HOUR LAws]. These laws are established at the state level through common law, 
legislation, or both. Id.at 6-7. The purpose of these laws is to provide an incentive for owners of 
alcohol establishments to train their employees in responsible beverage service. Id.at 2. 
109. See supranotes 66-105 and accompanying text. 
110. Ross,supranote66,at110. 
111. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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A. PromotingOUIAwarenessAmong Alcohol Serving Institutions 
It seems clear that people know about the risks associated with impaired driving 
and sincerely want something to be done to make the roads safer.1 12 The stumbling 
block is that most people do not appreciate the risk they create when they consume 
alcohol and drive; they do not consider themselves as "one of those people who drive 
drunk." Yet upwards of 159 million people admit that they have operated a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 13 Part of the problem is that most 
people do not set out to drink and drive.' 14 It is only after they consume alcohol and 
lose their inhibitions and their ability to think and reason clearly that the poor decision 
to drive impaired is made.' 15 People can be told countless times to have a designated 
driver or call for a ride home, but once an individual reaches the point where they 
should not be driving, often times it is too late for them to exercise caution. This is 
where shifting the focus to alcohol serving establishments can serve a valuable 
function. 
As there are serious drawbacks to relying solely upon educational programs 
targeting the general public, attention must be turned to other areas that contribute to 
the occurrence of OUL. The alcohol serving industry is one such area. Presently, 
there is no real deterrent for this industry-which thrives on serving large amounts of 
alcohol-to stop pushing alcohol on consumers. The current status of selling alcohol 
without regard to limits is not a mere matter of ignorance on behalf of management 
and wait staff, but is a calculated effort to increase revenue. If more of these 
establishments understood the risks and implications of their actions in continuing to 
serve alcohol to an individual up to and past the point of intoxication, they would 
make a concerted effort to stop doing so. These establishments know that under 
112. The Gallup Organization reports that "[tihe driving age public sees drinking and driving 
as a serious problem that needs to be dealt with. Virtually all (97%) see drinking and driving by 
others as a threat to their own personal safety and that oftheir family, and nearly three-quarters (73%) 
feel reducing drinking and driving is extremely important in terms of where tax dollars should be 
spent." GALLUPORGANIZATON, supranote 79, at ii. 
113. See NCIPC,supranote 1. 
114. NHTSA Deputy Administrator Jacqueline Glassman asserts,"[m]any people don't 
intend to drive while impaired. They just find themselves at the end of the night having had too 
much to drink, and without a sober designated driver. Unfortunately, too many of these drivers 
convince themselves and their friends that they're all right, because they're just 'buzzed."' News 
Release, Ad Council, U.S. Dep't of Transp. and Ad Council with Support from (State) Dep't of 




115. For an analysis of the effect alcohol has on an individual, see NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC 
SAFETY ADMIN., DRIvER CHARACTERIsTICs AND IMPAIRMENT AT VARIous BACs (2000), 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/pub/impaired-driving/BAC/index.html. 
116. NHTSA HAPPY HOUR LAWS, supranote 108, at 4-5. 
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existing licensing schemes and enforcement, the likelihood of being held responsible 
for an alcohol related accident is low. "Reductions in budgets, decreasing available 
personnel, the absence of public and governmental support, and difficulties 
coordinating efforts with local law enforcement are some of the problems that affect 
enforcement of over-consumption policies."" 7 While most states have Dram Shop 
Laws, 8 there is no uniformity in their drafting or application. Most notably, states 
have varying levels of proof on liability standards, on who can be held responsible 
and on what types of penalties can be imposed on violators. 19 Some ofthese statutes 
require evidence that the alcohol server acted negligently, while others require proof 
of either actual knowledge that the patron was intoxicated or recklessness on the part 
of the server.' Statutes also vary in terms of who can be held liable for over-serving 
alcohol to individuals. While most statutes appear to apply to both commercial and 
non-commercial servers, some of the statutory language is unclear and may be read to 
apply only to commercial establishments. 121 In terms of penalties, some statutes 
make a violation criminal, while others handle a violation as a civil matter. 
22 
Penalties typically range from suspension or revocation of liquor licenses to monetary 
fines or imprisonment. 23 This lack of uniformity makes ineffective what could 
otherwise be a very successful tool in combating OUI. 
One way to remedy pervasive weaknesses in the impact of Dram Shop Laws is 
to create and implement a National Dram Shop Act that sets in place uniform 
standards of liability, uniform definitions of who can be held liable, and uniform 
penalties. A federally mandated state by state law that holds both commercial and 
non-commercial servers civilly liable under a negligence standard will reduce the 
frequency with which individuals are over-served alcohol. The law must apply to 
both commercial and non-commercial alcohol servers in order to address all those 
that contribute to the dangers posed by OUI drivers. A negligence standard will 
encourage the education of alcohol servers on how to detect an intoxicated individual 
and will encourage vigilance in policing themselves regarding how much alcohol is 
provided to patrons. A civil standard would be most effective because it can be 
enforced administratively. 124  Offenses would be resolved more quickly and 
117. Id.at 8. 
118. The NHTSA reports that 47 states have some form of statutes prohibiting sales and 
service of alcohol to intoxicated people. However, these statutes are not uniform in their terms and 
application. See id. at 6. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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prosecutions would 
25
be more successful under the civil "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard.1
The federal government can encourage the enactment of such a law in the 
individual states through the use of its spending power, similar to how it encouraged 
states to increase their minimum drinking age to twenty-one and to adopt a per se .08 
BAC impairment level.' 2 6 Increasing and improving Dram Shop Laws and holding 
servers liable will force a more cautious exercise ofjudgment in how much to serve 
an individual and encourage alcohol serving establishments to have both 
management and wait staff educated in recognizing the symptoms of intoxication.' 
27 
Additionally, stricter liability laws may discourage popular happy hour and low price 
drink promotions that encourage individuals to over-drink.12 It will also have the 
added bonus of encouraging "designated driver" or "dial-a-ride" type programs 
within these establishments. Only when a business that serves alcohol fully grasps 
the consequences of over-serving someone and allowing them to drive it will be more 
careful serving alcohol. Implementation of standardized Dram Shop Laws should 
lower the risk of alcohol related injuries.' 
29 
B. Increasingthe CertaintyofApprehension 
It is clear that the probability of getting caught plays an integral role in an 
individual's decision to risk driving after consuming too much alcohol. 130 Therefore, 
a system that enhances the likelihood of apprehending drivers who are OUI must be 
uniformly implemented. Law enforcement officers must consistently arrest a 
125. Id 
126. Regarding raising the drinking age to 21, see supranote 16. See23 U.S.C. §163 (2000) 
(enacted to encourage states to lower the legal BAC level from .10 to .08). As part of the 
government's spending power, the law allowed the 
government to withhold 2 percent from federal highway funds, starting in 2004, if 
states did not comply with the federal mandate. Each subsequent year, until 2007, an 
additional 2 percent will be withheld from states that are not in compliance. Therefore, 
any state that does not pass legislation to lower the BAC to 0.08 will have 8 percent of 
their state's federal funding withheld in 2007, and each subsequent fiscal year 
thereafter. 
Christopher O'Neill, Legislating Under the Influence: Are FederalHighwayIncentives Enough To 
Induce State Legislatures to Pass a 0.08 Blood Alcohol ConcentrationStandard? 28 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 415, 416 (2004). 
127. NHTSA HAPPY HOUR LAWS, supranote 108, at 4-5. 
128. Id. 
129. In 1983, a dram shop liability law suit was brought in Texas. As a result, the state saw 
6.5% fewer single vehicle nighttime injury crashes and an additional 5.3% decrease occuned after 
another suit was filed in 1984. See Alexander C. Wagenaar & Harold D. Holder, Effects of 
Alcoholic Beverage Server Liability on Traffic Crash Injuries, 15 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL AND 
ExPERnRvENTAL RESEARCH 942,946(1991). 
130. See Ross, supranote 66, at 102-03. 
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sufficient number of violators to convince the general public that if they continue to 
drive while impaired they will get caught sooner rather than later.' 31 Achieving this 
means allocating resources to law enforcement agencies. In times where budgetary 
constraints are vast, and limited resources have been stretched thin, many are 
unwilling to earmark money for this cause.1 32 For that reason, states must create self-
sustaining funds to finance OUI enforcement efforts. These funds should consist of 
OUI offender-generated fees and fines as well as other assessments including 
alcoholic beverage taxes. Using these funds to supplement budgets will enable cities, 
towns and states to hire and better train law enforcement officers, to fund overtime 
details, and to purchase equipment needed to detect and preserve evidence of 
impairment. 
In order to increase the likelihood of apprehension, officers must be trained to 
recognize an impaired driver from visible cues and symptoms of intoxication. This 
means not only recognizing readily apparent symptoms such as odor of alcohol, 
red/glassy eyes and slurred speech, but also making observations of an individual's 
ability to follow directions as well as an individual's coordination and motor skills 
while performing standardized field sobriety test.133 Currently, "[t]he average law 
enforcement officer receives eight hours of training on impaired driving, yet the 
[NHTSA] and the National Criminal Justice Association recommend at least 40 hours 
ofacademy training on impaired driving."
1 34 
131. Id 
132. NHTSA HAPPY HOUR LAWS, supra note 108, at 8. 
133. Field Sobriety Tests are divided attention tests that require an individual to concentrate 
on mental and physical tasks at the same time. They are used to evaluate an individual's ability to 
listen to and follow simple instructions as well as to evaluate an individual's coordination and motor 
skills. The NHTSA determined that three such tests, when administered properly, are very accurate 
in determining if an individual is under the influence of alcohol. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety 
Admin., Development of a Standardized Field Sobriety Test, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/sfst/appendixa.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005). 
Those three standardized field sobriety test are the One Leg Stand Test, the 9 Step Walk and Turn 
Test, and the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test. Id In the one leg stand test, the driver is asked to put 
both hands at his side and lift one leg for 30 seconds while counting out loud. Id. In the walk and 
turn test, the driver is asked to place one foot in fiont of another, in a heel to toe fashion, again with 
his hands at his sides, and walk in a straight line for 9 steps while counting out loud. The driver then 
turns in a specific manner and walks back 9 steps. While an individual is performing the one leg 
stand and the walk and turn test the officer looks for "clues" to determine whether the driver 
successfully completes the tests. Id. The horizontal gaze nystagmus test involves looking at the 
driver's eyes. The officer asks the driver to stand still and follow a pen with only his eyes while the 
officer slowly moves the pen from left to right approximately 12 inches in front of the driver's face. 
While the driver performs the test, the officer is looking for a "nystagmus," an involuntary movement 
of the eye. Id 
134. MADD Online, MADD, Calls for Greater Use of Frequent, High-Visibility Law 
Enforcement to Prevent Drunk Driving, http://madd.org/news/9318 (last visited December 29, 2005). 
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In addition to training, there must be a sufficient number of officers patrolling the 
roads to ensure high visibility, to identify the offenders, and to implement the 
programs necessary to combat OU. Two of the most common OUI enforcement 
programs are sobriety checkpoints and saturation patrols that target high crime areas 
such as entertainment districts. Sobriety checkpoints are an integral and effective tool 
in stopping OUI.135 In Michigan v. Sitz, the Supreme Court ruled that sobriety 
checkpoints are constitutional since the compelling state interest in curtailing OUI-
and thus saving lives--outweighed the slight inconvenience caused by the 
checkpoints. 1 36 However, even after this decision, there are several states that do not 
allow sobriety checkpoints.' 37 Without that tool, law enforcement has to look for 
alternative means of portraying a high visibility. To that end, states that prohibit 
sobriety checkpoints often make use of saturation patrols. 138 Saturation patrols place 
a large amount of law enforcement officers in a concentrated area to increase 
visibility and thus deter driving members of the public from OUI. 13 9 When these 
saturation patrols are widely used and broadly publicized, they deliver a "strong 
message that alcohol impaired drivers will be detected and arrested.' 
14 ° 
Unfortunately, as budgetary constraints limit the amount of law enforcement officers 
135. The CDC conducted a study on the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints and found that 
crashes thought to involve alcohol dropped a median of twenty percent, and fatal crashes dropped 
twenty-three percent following the implementation of such checkpoints. GUIDE TO COMMUNITY 
PREVENTIVE SERVICES, EFFECTIVENESs OF SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS FOR PREvENTING ALCOHOL­
INVOLVED CRASHES 1 (2002), http://www.thecommunityguide.org/mvoi/movoi-alc-sobr­
chckpts.pdf. 
136. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,455 (1990). 
137. See, e.g., Sitz v. Dept' of State Police, 744 N.W. 2d 209, 224-25 (Mich. 1993) (holding 
sobriety checkpoints violated the Michigan constitution); State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1063 
(Id. 1988) (holding that sobriety checkpoints violate the Idaho Constitution); Mesiani v. City of 
Seattle, 755 P.2d 775, 778 (Wash. 1988) (holding that sobriety checkpoints violate Washington's 
constitution). However, in many states where sobriety checkpoints are permitted, the focus has 
shifted to whether the checkpoints are properly implemented and administered. See Village of 
Plainfield v. Anderson, 709 N.E.2d 976, 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the administrative 
process regarding sobriety checkpoints satisfied the Illinois constitution); State v. Superior Court, 
County of Cochise, 718 P.2d 171, 176 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that "roadside sobriety tests that do not 
involve long delay or unreasonable intrusion, although searches under the fourth amendment, may be 
justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion ... that the driver is intoxicated"). Moreover, if the 
Court finds the administration of the checkpoint was not done properly, then any evidence obtained 
during the checkpoint encounter will be suppressed. See State v. Gerchoffer, 763 N.E. 2d 960, 971 
(Ind. 2002) ("In light of the.., high level of officer discretion and the very weak link between the 
public danger posed by OWl and the objectives, location and timing of the checkpoint, the State did 
not meet its burden to show that this roadblock was constitutionally reasonable.... therefore [the trial 
court] correctly suppressed the" evidence obtained from the checkpoint.). 
138. MADD Online, Sobriety Checkpoints: A Law Enforcement Perspective, 
http://madd.org/news/1269 (last visited Sept. 6, 2006). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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who are available to patrol, the use of saturation patrols is not as widespread as is 
necessary to have a meaningful deterrent effect. In order to improve this method of 
deterrence, funding assistance is crucial. Since alcohol related traffic accidents cost 
the public an estimated $45 to $50 billion each year, the allocation of monies to law 
enforcement to combat this crime is justifiable.
141 
In addition to allocating funds for hiring, training and overtime details, resources 
must also be allotted to ensure that law enforcement has the equipment necessary to 
combat the crime. These tools include passive alcohol sensors 142 ("PAS"), portable 
or preliminary breath test machines 143 ("PBT'), and cameras mounted on police 
cruisers. The PAS is a relatively inexpensive, small, hand-held analytical device used 
to qualitatively measure the presence or absence of alcohol in the air surrounding an 
individual.' 44 Unlike traditional breath test machines, the PAS does not measure the 
quantity of alcohol on an individual's breath.'45 Therefore, the PAS can be used by 
law enforcement officers while speaking with the operator of a motor vehicle to help 
detect if the operator consumed alcohol. 146 While use of such a device does not 
prove impairment, it may turn a routine traffic stop into an investigation for OUI and 
effectively get impaired drivers off the roads. The portable breath test machines can 
be used during a traffic stop to give a quantitative measure ofalcohol consumed by an 
individual. 14  Portable breath tests machines are invaluable tools because often times 
a PBT reading is the only quantitative result an officer can obtain. This is because 
many individuals will agree to take the PBT during the initial traffic stop for an OUI 
investigation; however, after an arrest and transport to the police station where they 
are read their rights and booked, the individual is more likely to become 
noncompliant and refuse the breath test. By administering the PBT in the field, 
141. See NCIPC,supranote 1. 
142. The PAS "utilize[s] fuel cell technology to detect alcohol. A fuel cell is a porous disk 
containing a solution that oxidizes ethanol into carbon dioxide and water, while releasing electrons. 
The electrons are present in proportion to the amount of ethanol present, allowing the fuel cell to 
perform as a linear sensing device.... [The PAS] utilizes either a pump or a fan to draw a sample 
breath containing ambient air into the device for analysis." Wisc. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PASSIVE 
ALCOHOL SENSORS: A STUDy FOcUsING ON THEIR USE, PERFORMANCE, EFFECTrvENEss, AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT 14 (2002), 
http://www.dot.state.wi.us/library/publications/topic/safety/pascomplete.pdf. 
143. Aportable breath test is a small, inexpensive, battery operated hand held device that uses 
fuel cell technology to measure the amount ofalcohol within a human. An individual blows into the 
device which introduces a sample of lung air into a specialized fuel cell. The combination of alcohol 
and the fuel cell creates a chemical reaction that produces electrons. The number of electrons 
produced is then displayed on the unit. See Martin Judnich, An Analysis ofthe PortableBreathTest: 
MontanaCourt Says Hand-HeldDevice Works OK- But DoesIt?31 Mont. Lawyer 18, 18 (2005). 
144. WIsc. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supranote 142, at 14. 
145. Id. at 14-15. 
146. Id. at 17. 
147. Id. at 15. 
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officers are gaining valuable information that may not be available if postponed until 
after the suspect is arrested. 
Along the same line, if police vehicles are equipped with cameras, law 
enforcement officers could document valuable evidence depicting how the 
intoxicated driver operated the motor vehicle, the driver's demeanor and behavior 
during the stop, and the driver's performance during field sobriety tests. Armed with 
the correct equipment, law enforcement officers will be better able to apprehend and 
convict people who are OUL. 
C. Increasingthe LikelihoodofConvictionandPunishment 
As ofAugust 2005, all fifty states passed a law stating that anyone who operates 
a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content ("BAC") at or above .08 has per se 
committed the offense of impaired driving.14 8 While this is an important step to 
increasing the likelihood of conviction, it only helps when an individual charged with 
OUI agrees to take a breath test. Another step some states have taken to increase the 
likelihood of conviction involves allowing prosecutors to introduce certified copies of 
court records, motor vehicle registry records, department of corrections documents, 
or probation documents as evidence that demonstrates a defendant has a previous 
conviction for OUI. 149 By allowing the prosecution to prove a subsequent offense 
through the use of these documents and by not requiing live testimony, the chances 
of conviction increase. Unfortunately, other legislation and court decisions decrease 
the likelihood of conviction and punishment for OUI offenders.' 50 Because of this, 
some argue that the best way to create a swifter, more certain consequence for 
impaired driving is through decriminalizing the offense. 
H. Laurence Ross suggests that by decriminalizing OUI, at least for an 
individual's first offense, and having the offense adjudicated by an administrative 
agency, such as the department of motor vehicles, the probability of conviction will 
increase, as will the celerity of punishment.'51 By treating OUI as a traffic violation 
akin to speeding, Ross asserts that "it would place the routine violation in a fitting 
legal category... [with] one of the current law's major problems [being] its treatment 
of drivers as criminals when they are not believed by the public to warrant this 
designation."'152 Decriminalizing OUI will likely increase the speed in which an OUI 
charge is resolved as the case would not have to flow through an already over­
burdened criminal justice system. Instead, it would be handled by a leaner, faster 
administrative agency. 153 Additionally, the probability an individual charged with 
148. MADD Online, supranote 6. 
149. See, e.g., MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 24D (2005). 
150. See supranotes 84-86. 
151. Ross, supranote 66, at l10. 
152. Id 
153. Id 
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OUI will be convicted is greater in a civil context because the standard of proof 
would require only a preponderance of evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt as required in the criminal system.' 54 Finally, at civil hearings, evidence of an 
individual's refusal to take a breath test or field sobriety tests would be admissible to 
show consciousness of guilt. After a decision of culpability is made, the 
administrative agency would then sanction the offender through a number of 
punishments, exclusive of imprisonment and probation. 
While decriminalizing OUI may seem to alleviate many of the problems the 
prosecution faces in terms of getting a conviction, its main weakness is that it sends a 
symbolic message to the public that alcohol impaired driving is nothing more than a 
minor traffic offense or routine violation. Even if decriminalization applies only to 
first offenses where there are no injuries, it has the effect of portraying to the public 
that they are allowed one "get out ofjail free card." If they get caught OUI but are 
lucky enough not to have hurt or killed anyone, they get a break. However, if it is a 
first offense and an accident is involved, then it will be taken seriously and will be 
treated as a criminal matter. Such a message desensitizes the public and allows them 
to justify taking the risk of engaging in irresponsible drinking and driving. That may 
consequently result in an increased occurrence of OUTI. 
Another downside of decriminalizing OUI is in enforcement of the sanctions 
placed on the offender. In a criminal case, if an offender is placed on probation with 
conditionary terms that he not operate a motor vehicle, attend driver's education 
classes, attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, or any other conditions, and he fails 
to comply with those terms and conditions, a violation of probation hearing will be 
instituted. 5 While on probation, an individual has a strong incentive to comply with 
the sentence, whereas an administrative sentence does not promote compliance. This 
may be remedied by making failure to comply with administrative sanctions a 
criminal offense. For example, if an individual is caught operating a motor vehicle 
while his license is suspended for OUI, he could be criminally charged with a 
conviction resulting in the imposition of a mandatory jail sentence. 
It is clear that, whether OUI is treated civilly or criminally, one of the most 
difficult challenges is finding the correct combination of sanctions to reduce the high 
recidivism rate in this country.' 56 Currently, almost one-third of all offenders arrested 
for OUI are repeat offenders.' 57  This means that the punishment imposed for 
committing this offense must be designed with particular attention to specifically 
deterring the individual offender more than deterring society in general. 
158 
Traditional measures of sentencing include jail, probation, Alcoholics Anonymous 
154. NHTSA HAPPY HOUR LAWs, supra note 108, at 7. 
155. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90 § 24(1)(a)(4) (2005). 
156. CAvAIOLA& Wurm, supranote 10, at 129. 
157. Id.at 125. 
158. See MADD Online, Sentence Structure, http://madd.org/news/4263 (last visited Sept. 4, 
2006). 
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meetings, substance abuse treatment, random drug and breath tests, loss of driver's 
license, fines, and driver's education school. 59  In addition, attendance at victim 
impact panels, 16 mandatory installation of ignition interlock devices,' 61 confiscation 
or forfeiture of the offender's car, and electronic monitoring are also becoming 
increasingly common. 
Despite these measures, recidivism rates continue to remain high, indicating that 
these traditional sentences are not working.
1 62  As rates continue to increase 
163 
judges nationwide are employing innovative sanctions and programs designed to 
deter offenders from recommitting the same offense. Some have termed this non­
traditional approach as "hybrid" or "scarlet letter" sentencing. 164  This type of 
punishment is meant to cause public humiliation and shock, thus deterring crime by 
causing changes in the offender's behavior.' 65  Some examples of scarlet letter 
sentences include requiring offenders to do the following: carry a placard identifying 
themselves as a "drunk driver"; place a fluorescent orange bumper sticker on their car 
identifying themselves as a convicted OUI driver; wear a fluorescent bracelet 
identifying themselves as a convicted OUI driver; carry a special license marked with 
colorful "OUI" letters identifying themselves as a repeat offender; erect and maintain 
markers at the site of an OUI accident to honor victims; and give their own vehicle to 
the victim until the victim's car was repaired. 
166 
Those opposed to these alternative sentences assert that scarlet letter penalties 
"represent a reversion to barbarism" and are "uncivilized.' ' 167 They maintain society 
long ago determined that public shaming and humiliation was an inhumane and 
ineffective method of deterring crime and that this remains true today.168 Others 
oppose these sentences expressing concern that "renegade judges will abuse their 
159. Id 
160. A victim impact panel is where a group of victims of alcohol-related accidents and/or 
their families meet and discuss the affect the crime ofOUI has had on them. 
161. Seesupranote5l. 
162. SeeMADDOnline,supranote 158. 
163. Id 
164. See id.; see also Barbara Clare Morton, BringingSkeletons Out of the Closet andInto 
the Light--ScarletLetterSentencing CanMeet the GoalofProbationin Modem American Because 
itDeprivesOffenders ofPrivacy,35 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 97, 97 (2001). 
165. MADD Online, supranote 158. 
166. Morton, supra note 164, at 116-18 n.160-61 (discussing unique punishments handed 
down by three different judges in OUI cases). See also MADD Online, supranote 158. 
167. Morton, supra note 164, at 100 (citing Leonore H. Tavill, ScarletLetter Punishment: 
Yesterday's OutlawedPenaltyis Today's ProbationCondition,36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 643 (1988) 
(declaring humiliation attendant in scarlet letter sentences "uncivilized"); Julie Deardorff,ForShame: 
Courts Using Humiliation as Punishment,THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Apr. 23, 2000, at Al 1 (noting 
some believe contemporary scarlet letter sentencing barbaric)). 
168. Leonore H. Tavill, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's OutlawedPenaltyis Today 
ProbationCondition,36 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 613, 653 (1988). 
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discretion if allowed to impose these unconventional penalties.", 69  In practice, 
because offenders on probation do not benefit from the same constitutional liberty as 
other citizens, and because judges are routinely afforded broad discretion in imposing 
punishment, courts customarily consider most of these non-traditional sentences 
constitutional as long as they directly relate to the purpose of probation and do not 
rise to extreme levels.170 Additionally, the public appears to be willing to embrace the 




Deaths, injuries and property damage caused by impaired drivers are preventable 
crimes, not accidents. Current efforts to deter individuals from operating under the 
influence of alcohol are not producing satisfactory results. The public's 
unwillingness to label OUI offenders as criminals, uneven application of laws, and a 
court system that still treats OUTI offenses as accidents, all contribute to the 
continuation of this dangerous behavior. To stimulate reductions in the occurrence of 
OUI, a uniform Dram Shop Act must be implemented in every state. This law ought 
to increasingly focus on holding responsible both commercial and non-commercial 
establishments that negligently provide alcohol to impaired individuals. Additionally, 
law enforcement agencies must be adequately staffed, funded and properly equipped 
to apprehend impaired drivers. To that end, states should establish offender-
generated, self-sustaining funds to finance these efforts. Furthermore, legislatures 
must enact laws that impose negative consequences on motorists who refuse to take a 
breath test or field sobriety test. It is imperative that such a refusal result in a 
substantial loss of license that remains in effect even if the underlying OUI is 
resolved. To help reduce the recidivism rate, subsequent offenders must be 
compelled to install in their vehicle, at their own expense, an ignition interlock 
device. Finally, sentences must be crafted that carry more than the imaginary sting of 
jail time to deter an offender from committing the offense. In order to truly stop 
impaired driving, "You Drink, You Drive, You Lose" must be more than a threat-it 
must be a promise. 
169. Morton, supranote164, at 100n.13. 
170. Id.at 118. 
171. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 591, 637 
(1996) ("Public opinion studies suggest that the public is prepared to endorse such penalties with 
enthusiasm, provided it can be shown that they really work") (citing JOHN DOBLE, CRIME AND 
PuNiSHMEN. THE PUBLIC'S VIEW 39-40 (1987); Jonathan Alter & Pat Wimgert, The Return ofShame, 
NEWSWEEK 21, 24 (Feb 6, 1995) (finding majority support use of shaming penalties for certain 
offenses but are skeptical about effectiveness)). 
